Read what we write
Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:
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24 February 2016 - Lear Competition Notes
, Cartels, Competition Economics
Non c’è da raccontare storie, serve una storia! Intese per oggetto e analisi economica
La LCN commenta la recente sentenza con cui il Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale del Lazio ha accolto il ricorso di UnipolSai contro il Provvedimento n. 25382 dell’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato. La LCN si focalizza su due dei principi enunciati nella sentenza, quello della congruenza narrativa dell’ipotesi collusiva e quello della astratta idoneità dell’accordo […] Read more
16 December 2015 - Research Papers
, Competition Economics, Mergers
Merger in the Dutch grocery sector: an ex-post evaluation
This study evaluates the appropriateness of some merger decisions undertaken by the Autoriteit Consument & Markt (ACM) in the Dutch grocery shopping sector. We analyze three related merger decisions published between 2009 and 2012 and involving major supermarket chains. We conduct both a qualitative and a quantitative analysis and examine the effect of the mergers […] Read more
10 September 2015 - Research Papers
, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements
Vertical restraints on e-commerce and selective distribution
This paper discusses whether, when manufacturers choose to adopt a selective distribution system, vertical restraints imposed on electronic commerce (e-commerce) may work in the interest of consumers or have anticompetitive consequences that require an antitrust intervention. The paper presents the basic economic concepts that apply to vertical restraints, and identifies the efficiency reasons and the […] Read more
10 January 2015 - Lear Competition Notes
, Competition Economics, Mergers
Optimal pre-merger notification thresholds: an economic approach
The level of pre-merger notification thresholds is a matter of extreme importance to guarantee an effective and efficient merger review regime. On the one hand, the higher the thresholds the higher the risk of having potential anticompetitive mergers that might not be assessed by the relative authority. On the other hand, imposing notification to all […] Read more
17 July 2014 - Lear Competition Notes
, Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics
Price-cost test in predatory abuses: treatment of common cost and multiperiod
Predatory prices are a particular type of exclusionary abuse whereby a dominant firm incurs short-term losses by charging a lower price deliberately with the intent to foreclose competitors. The antitrust analysis of predatory conduct entails the application of price-cost tests. These tests are based on the comparison of the retail price of a dominant firm […] Read more
26 November 2013 - Lear Competition Notes
, Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Litigation
Statistical significance and the standard of proof in antitrust damage quantification
Econometric techniques can play an important role in damage quantification cases regarding breaches of antitrust law. In this short note, starting from a prima facie simple convention on how to interpret the estimated regression coefficients, we will discuss how a deep understanding of both the specific legal framework and the relevant technical aspects is important […] Read more
1 July 2013 - Research Papers
, Competition Economics, Mergers
The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm’s Valuation
EU antitrust investigations involve a sequence of events which affect the investigated firm’s market value. We model these relationships and estimate their impact on firms’ share prices. On average, a surprise inspection reduces a firm’s share price by 2.89%, an infringement decision reduces it by 3.57%. The Court judgments do not have a statistically significant […] Read more
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