Read what we write
Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:
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5 November 2015 - Presentations
On-line Intermediation and Antitrust Economics
This presentation deals with Across-Platform Parity Agreements (APPAs) developing a simple framework to assess APPA’s competitive effects.
10 September 2015 - Research Papers
, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements
Vertical restraints on e-commerce and selective distribution
This paper discusses whether, when manufacturers choose to adopt a selective distribution system, vertical restraints imposed on electronic commerce (e-commerce) may work in the interest of consumers or have anticompetitive consequences that require an antitrust intervention. The paper presents the basic economic concepts that apply to vertical restraints, and identifies the efficiency reasons and the […] Read more
26 June 2015 - Presentations
Across Platforms Parity Agreements
This presentation shows: Vertical-PRAs, antitrust theories of harm, efficiency justifications. Object infringement for PRAs may be inappropriate.
15 June 2015 - Presentations
Economic Foundation & Analysis
A lesson on the economic foundation of competition policy delivered by Paolo Buccirossi at the Trento Summer School, June 2015.
20 April 2015 - Presentations
Adozione di un effect based approach nella valutazione delle intese restrittive: risvolti operativi e conseguenze per il private enforcement
Adozione di un effects based approach nella valutazione delle intese restrittive: risvolti operativi e conseguenze per il private enforcement.
17 April 2015 - Presentations
La quantificazione del danno antitrust: la Guida Pratica della Commissione Europea
Una presentazione della Guida Pratica della Commissione Europea: metodi e tecniche per la quantificazione del danno antitrust.
25 February 2015 - Research Papers
, Litigation
Leniency and Damages
Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated […] Read more
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