Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:
I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on “income smoothing” – manager-led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors. Capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion […] Read more
This paper presents a competitive assessment of the global market for the provision of universal Internet connectivity (backbone market). We discuss the approach followed by the EC Commission in two important merger cases. The main argument is for a restless evolution of the structure of the market, whereby an highly concentrated US-centric industry, with a […] Read more
This report presents a competitive assessment of the Internet infrastructure across Europe. The analysis ranges from the upstream global market for the provision of universal Internet connectivity to the downstream national markets for the provision of local network access.
This report deals with the provision of content and other applications to Internet users. The first part is focused on information/entertainment content applications. The second one addresses the issue of e-commerce.
Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to “cheat” on partners. Optimally designed “courageous” leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties, and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. […] Read more
This paper analyzes the consequences of the size of an auction, in terms of the volume of product and the time lenght covered by the auctioned contract, on the incentive bidders have to collude. The paper shows that the recommendation to increase as much as possible the auction size in order to prevent bidders from […] Read more
I describe a price game in which consumers face search costs and base their quantity decision on the expected price. Because of search costs, the choice of the firm they will buy from is described by a random process. I show that the expected equilibrium price is above the monopoly price. This result does not […] Read more