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Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:

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15 June 2002 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Indizi economici e collusione

Economic evidence and proof of a collusive agreement. I investigate whether some economic observations may contribute to prove the existence of an illegal collusive agreement. The facts analyzed are: simultaneous increase in prices, price parallelism, market shares stability, price similarity among firms when firms have different costs, price similarity among firms and products when products […] Read more


15 June 2001 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Parallelismo e collusione

Antitrust authorities often consider parallelism of firms’ strategies and market share stability as clues of illegal collusion in the form of concerted practices. In this paper I show that this inference may be contrary to some theoretical results. I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over […] Read more


15 April 2000 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition

I show that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, profits are distributed as dividends, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them […] Read more


Scelte di policy e definizione del mercato rilevante: un modello strategico
15 February 2000 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Mergers

Scelte di policy e definizione del mercato rilevante: un modello strategico

Published by the Italian Competition Authority in its series Temi e problemi n. 10


14 February 2000 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

The Effects of Leniency on Illegal Transactions: How (Not) to Fight Corruption

We study the consequences of ‘leniency’ – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly counterproductive. In reality leniency is typically “moderate,” in the sense of only reducing, […] Read more


15 November 1999 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion

Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms’ ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to make firms’ objective function strictly concave and market supergames “interdependent”: firms’ payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even […] Read more


14 September 1999 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements, Mergers, Regulation

Access to an Essential Facility: Efficient Component Pricing Rule or Unrestricted Private Property Rights

In this paper we compare the access to an essential facility in two different property rights regimes. In one of them, the owner of the facility has a full private property right. In the other, access is regulated according to the efficient component pricing rule. Proponents of the second regime claim that this rule is […] Read more