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Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on “income smoothing” – manager-led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors. Capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have these preferences/incentives and demand fluctuates, “price wars during booms” need not occur: the most collusive price may then be pro-cyclical.

Published in European Economic Review (July 2005), pages 235-254.


Date: July 2005
Author(s): Giancarlo Spagnolo
Tag(s): Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics