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Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:

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13 August 2006 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behavior

Antitrust authorities often consider parallel pricing and market share stability to be clues of illegal collusion. To analyze whether this inference is correct, I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over time. In many cases parallel pricing does not distinguish between a competitive and a collusive […] Read more


15 July 2006 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Does Parallel Behavior Provide Some Evidence of Collusion?

Antitrust authorities often consider parallel pricing and market share stability to be clues of illegal collusion. To analyze whether this inference is correct, I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over time. In many cases parallel pricing does not distinguish between a competitive and a collusive […] Read more


13 December 2005 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Optimal Fines in the Era of Whisteblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterennce effects under different assumptions on the legal and economic environment. It is likely that European fines have not had significant deterrence effects before leniency programs were introduced. Previous simulations of the effects of fines ignore the different […] Read more


15 July 2005 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on “income smoothing” – manager-led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors. Capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion […] Read more


15 June 2005 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Mergers

Competition in the Internet Backbone Market

This paper presents a competitive assessment of the global market for the provision of universal Internet connectivity (backbone market). We discuss the approach followed by the EC Commission in two important merger cases. The main argument is for a restless evolution of the structure of the market, whereby an highly concentrated US-centric industry, with a […] Read more


14 November 2004 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to “cheat” on partners. Optimally designed “courageous” leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties, and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. […] Read more


13 April 2004 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Auction Size and Collusion

This paper analyzes the consequences of the size of an auction, in terms of the volume of product and the time lenght covered by the auctioned contract, on the incentive bidders have to collude. The paper shows that the recommendation to increase as much as possible the auction size in order to prevent bidders from […] Read more