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Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:

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9 September 2012 - Research Papers , Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements

Can ‘Fair’ Prices Be Unfair? A Review of Price Relationship Agreements

The report, prepared for the OFT by LEAR, examines the various forms these agreements can take, their potential benefits and anti-competitive effects, drawing on economic literature and relevant case law. The OFT will present the findings today at a joint workshop held by the US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice on the implications […] Read more

6 November 2011 - Lear Competition Notes , Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Regulation

Which test for bundled discounts

Bundled discounts are a form of price cutting which are presumptively beneficial to consumers. However, bundle offers from a dominant firm might exploit market power to foreclose competitors, thus harming consumers. The European Commission and the DoJ set out a framework to analyze the potential exclusionary effects of bundled discounts by dominant firms. Focusing on […] Read more

1 September 2010 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements, Litigation, Regulation

The Enforcement of Imperfect Rules

This paper examines the optimal sanction for rules that are imperfect in that they are either overinclusive, as they prohibit an action that in some circumstances is beneficial, or underinclusive as they allow agents to undertake alternative conducts that are harmful, or both. The paper clarifies why this notion of imperfection divers from the notion […] Read more

1 October 2009 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Policy Assessments, Regulation

Deterrence in Competition Law

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of […] Read more

10 January 2007 - Research Papers , Competition Economics, Mergers, Policy Assessments

Ex post review of merger control decisions

In this study prepared for the European Commission Lear proposes a methodology for the ex-post assessment of merger control decisions. The aim of the methodology is to establish whether the market structure arising from the decision protects social welfare better than the market structures that could have arisen from alternative decisions. The methodology also assesses […] Read more

13 September 2006 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Policy Assessments

The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82

The object of this research produced by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) from LEAR is to improve the understanding of the costs of inappropriate competition authority (non) intervention in cases relating to abuse of dominance. A key aim is a greater understanding of these ‘error costs’ by type of abuse, industry characteristics and […] Read more

15 August 2006 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Leniency policies and illegal transactions

We study the consequences of leniency—reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers—on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager–auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that—when not properly designed—leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism […] Read more