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Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:

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14 November 2004 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to “cheat” on partners. Optimally designed “courageous” leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties, and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. […] Read more


13 April 2004 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Auction Size and Collusion

This paper analyzes the consequences of the size of an auction, in terms of the volume of product and the time lenght covered by the auctioned contract, on the incentive bidders have to collude. The paper shows that the recommendation to increase as much as possible the auction size in order to prevent bidders from […] Read more


15 December 2003 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements, Litigation, Mergers, Policy Assessments, Regulation

A Search Model Where Consumers Choose Quantity Based on Expected Price

I describe a price game in which consumers face search costs and base their quantity decision on the expected price. Because of search costs, the choice of the firm they will buy from is described by a random process. I show that the expected equilibrium price is above the monopoly price. This result does not […] Read more


15 August 2002 - Research Papers , Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Mergers, Policy Assessments

Competition Policy and the Agribusiness Sector in the European Union

This paper analyses the main antitrust decisions in the agribusiness sector in Europe. First, legislation and economic principles are recalled. Then for input suppliers, farmers, manufacturers, and retailers, we give a brief presentation of the market structure and discuss the main competition concerns according to the most recent antitrust decisions. Farmers are the weakest link […] Read more


15 June 2002 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Indizi economici e collusione

Economic evidence and proof of a collusive agreement. I investigate whether some economic observations may contribute to prove the existence of an illegal collusive agreement. The facts analyzed are: simultaneous increase in prices, price parallelism, market shares stability, price similarity among firms when firms have different costs, price similarity among firms and products when products […] Read more


15 June 2001 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Parallelismo e collusione

Antitrust authorities often consider parallelism of firms’ strategies and market share stability as clues of illegal collusion in the form of concerted practices. In this paper I show that this inference may be contrary to some theoretical results. I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over […] Read more


15 April 2000 - Research Papers , Cartels, Competition Economics

Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition

I show that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, profits are distributed as dividends, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them […] Read more