Read what we write
Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:
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1 October 2009 - Research Papers
, Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Policy Assessments, Regulation
Deterrence in Competition Law
This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of […] Read more
10 January 2007 - Research Papers
, Competition Economics, Mergers, Policy Assessments
Ex post review of merger control decisions
In this study prepared for the European Commission Lear proposes a methodology for the ex-post assessment of merger control decisions. The aim of the methodology is to establish whether the market structure arising from the decision protects social welfare better than the market structures that could have arisen from alternative decisions. The methodology also assesses […] Read more
13 September 2006 - Research Papers
, Abuse of Dominance, Competition Economics, Policy Assessments
The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82
The object of this research produced by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) from LEAR is to improve the understanding of the costs of inappropriate competition authority (non) intervention in cases relating to abuse of dominance. A key aim is a greater understanding of these ‘error costs’ by type of abuse, industry characteristics and […] Read more
15 August 2006 - Research Papers
, Cartels, Competition Economics
Leniency policies and illegal transactions
We study the consequences of leniency—reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers—on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager–auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that—when not properly designed—leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism […] Read more
13 August 2006 - Research Papers
, Cartels, Competition Economics
Corporate Governance and Collusive Behavior
Antitrust authorities often consider parallel pricing and market share stability to be clues of illegal collusion. To analyze whether this inference is correct, I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over time. In many cases parallel pricing does not distinguish between a competitive and a collusive […] Read more
15 July 2006 - Research Papers
, Cartels, Competition Economics
Does Parallel Behavior Provide Some Evidence of Collusion?
Antitrust authorities often consider parallel pricing and market share stability to be clues of illegal collusion. To analyze whether this inference is correct, I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over time. In many cases parallel pricing does not distinguish between a competitive and a collusive […] Read more
13 December 2005 - Research Papers
, Cartels, Competition Economics
Optimal Fines in the Era of Whisteblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?
We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterennce effects under different assumptions on the legal and economic environment. It is likely that European fines have not had significant deterrence effects before leniency programs were introduced. Previous simulations of the effects of fines ignore the different […] Read more
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