Read what we write
Our economists publish research papers, write notes and make presentations on projects we have worked on. Have a look to our publications below:
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25 February 2015 - Research Papers
, Litigation
Leniency and Damages
Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated […] Read more
26 November 2013 - Lear Competition Notes
, Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Litigation
Statistical significance and the standard of proof in antitrust damage quantification
Econometric techniques can play an important role in damage quantification cases regarding breaches of antitrust law. In this short note, starting from a prima facie simple convention on how to interpret the estimated regression coefficients, we will discuss how a deep understanding of both the specific legal framework and the relevant technical aspects is important […] Read more
1 September 2010 - Research Papers
, Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements, Litigation, Regulation
The Enforcement of Imperfect Rules
This paper examines the optimal sanction for rules that are imperfect in that they are either overinclusive, as they prohibit an action that in some circumstances is beneficial, or underinclusive as they allow agents to undertake alternative conducts that are harmful, or both. The paper clarifies why this notion of imperfection divers from the notion […] Read more
15 December 2003 - Research Papers
, Abuse of Dominance, Cartels, Competition Economics, Cooperation and Vertical Agreements, Litigation, Mergers, Policy Assessments, Regulation
A Search Model Where Consumers Choose Quantity Based on Expected Price
I describe a price game in which consumers face search costs and base their quantity decision on the expected price. Because of search costs, the choice of the firm they will buy from is described by a random process. I show that the expected equilibrium price is above the monopoly price. This result does not […] Read more
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