

Lear Competition Conference

Panel on Merger Remedies

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Economics in merger remedies

- What may happen:
 - Remedies may be offered in “phase 0”, phase 1, phase 2
 - “Let’s park that and see...” (limits if data from third parties needed)
 - With the EC, remedies are broad-brush / clear-cut until S/O in Phase 2 (but can be significant)
 - Then more precise focus on removing SIEC
- Economics relevant to asking the right questions and, in some cases, doing quantitative assessments
 - For notifying parties (in EC, whole case and Form RM)
 - Contesting third parties
 - Those claiming to be viable purchasers



Economics in merger remedies

- If planning remedies, clearly have to consider economic effects as you evaluate what is the counterweight to the perceived issue
 - Relative repositioning of the merged entity to others
- But economics is not all
 - Scope for judgment between solutions offered (e.g. strict economic logic of remedy (efficiency) v. coverage/size (scope))
 - “L’art du possible”
 - “Business savvy” considerations (how the business really works)
- Difficult part may be the analysis of the incentives for the acquirer and its potential to use the assets effectively



Structural v. behavioural remedies

- Practical issue is that if there is a risk that the purchaser ends up with a hold separate, then he has to consider what “walk away” and valuation rights he has (e.g. if potential synergies not realised)
 - I.e. It goes to the initial drafting of the SPA or related agreements
- Structural questions very different to behavioural
 - Can you sell to a suitable purchaser promptly?
 - Will this reduce barriers to entry? (access commitments)
 - Will it work and can you monitor? (e.g. access conditions)
- In a worldwide case you may have both types of remedy
 - *Drager/Airshields* case (UK)
 - (Also clearly in mixed packages of remedies)

Structural v. behavioural remedies (2)

- All merger control authorities appear to favour structural remedies, with some favouring up-front buyers (i.e. no implementation until purchaser for divested assets/business agreed/approved)
- Few behavioural commitments in Phase 1 undertakings (less than 5%?)
- UK approach on remedies appears widely respected (risk assessment categories for different types of remedy)
- Chinese issue at the moment (hold separates/firewalls)
 - E.g *Seagate/Samsung*, *Western Digital/Viviti*, and now *Marubeni/Gavilon*



Practical issues in design/implementation

- Take time to design, plan, evaluate and implement
 - “Phase 0” can be long; day extensions in Phase 1 & 2; “time out” (stop-the-clock, re-filing)
- Bear in mind third party inputs
 - “You must be joking”
 - Strategic counters / genuine points!
- What happens if cannot complete
 - Could happen (especially in the recession)
 - Especially if requirements demanding in circumstances or markets changing
 - New decisions? Or “l’art du possible” (again)?



Practical issues in design/implementation (2)

- Different remedies imply different structures
 - Sales, access, firewalls
 - Different solutions often required worldwide because of local market conditions (e.g. South African *Unilever/Sara Lee* case; also part of the recent Chinese decisions).
- Trustee is often more of a facilitator rather than a policeman
 - Needs to maintain integrity, yet not be too legalistic
 - Willingness to find solutions
 - Issues may come up which the case team never realised might happen, yet a decision has been taken.
- Need for review provisions (*Shell/Montecatini*)



Further reading

John Ratliff and Frédéric Louis, “*International Merger Remedies*”,
Chapter in the Merger Control Review (Enclosed)

Excellent slide presentations on Merger Remedies in an
EU/China meeting on remedies October 2012

<http://www.euchinacomp.org/index.php/mergers>

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